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A l g e r i a
TA S S A D I T  Y A C I N E
The legislative elections of June 1997 have enabled an
apparently new political map to be drawn up. From
these elections emerged a coalition government com-
posed of ministers representing the RND, the FLN and
the MSP (Mouvement de la Socit pour la Paix [Move-
ment of Society for Peace], formerly Hamas, the moder-
ate Islamic political tendency described in more detail
below). These three parties constitute the current
majority in the Assembly Ð a majority which gives Presi-
dent Zeroual a degree of room to manoeuvre.
The HAMAS Movement
A Moderate
F a c e o f A l g e r i a n
I s l a m i s mFor its part, the parliamentary opposition ismade up of parties occupying about a hundred
seats. Some of these parties are very old; oth-
ers have appeared more recently. The former
are characterized by the charisma of their lead-
ers, the leaders of the national movement.
Essentially, they are the FFS (Hocine Ar
AhmedÕs Front des Forces Socialistes), the PRS
(Mohammed BoudiafÕs Parti de la Rvolution
Socialiste; which dissolved itself in 1979), the
PCA (Parti Communiste Algrien which was
later to become the PAGS) and the MDA
(Ahmed Ben BellaÕs Mouvement pour la
Dmocratie en Algrie). As their acronyms sug-
gest, the PRS and the FFS, as well as the PAGS,
remain attached to the principles of the revo-
lution in its socialist sense. Ben BellaÕs MDA,
which arrived late in the day, advocates
democracy and does not abandon the idea of
modern Islam. They recruit from the older gen-
eration (those who experienced the Algerian
War) but also from younger people: those who
are discontented with the system. As far as the
FFS, the PRS and the PAGS are concerned, they
are composed of intellectuals who are looking
for an ideological and political doctrine (social-
ism and democracy in the case of the first two
parties, socialism without democracy in the
case of the PAGS and democracy without
socialism in the case of the MDA). In addition
to a radical reform of the system that it has
always advocated, the FFS has succeeded in
opening itself up to other demands: the Berber
culture and gender equality. Generally speak-
ing, almost all of these parties are open to
progress and the separation of politics and reli-
g i o n .
Recent Opposition or
R a d i c a l I s l a m i s m
It is the Islamists who are mobilizing the most
and who are mainly recruiting among the
working class (the FIS) and the more favoured
classes (Hamas, Nahda, etc.). Roughly speak-
ing, one could say that two main currents run
across the opposition parties as a whole: radi-
cal opposition to the government such as the
old FIS (dissolved). This movement has given
birth to at least two armed branches (MIA and
AIS), as well as the GIA. With the ÔtruceÕ of 1997,
the old FIS is attempting to return to the polit-
ical stage. The guerrillas, led by the GIA, are, of
course, opposed to negotiation. The Islamist
area is troubled by bloody disputes according
to the objectives of the various factions which
appear to follow different strategies. The GIA,
on one side infiltrated by the security services
and by groups linked to the organized crime
surrounding it are also in favour of the eradica-
tion of everything which does not conform to
their vision of the world. The armed wing of
the FIS (the AIS) seems more politicized than
the GIA and it is no coincidence if the govern-
ment undertakes negotiations with represen-
tatives of the AIS, thus Ôkilling two birds with
one stoneÕ: it is a way of excluding the GIA and
the political leaders of the old FIS. 
ÔModerateÕ Opposition
or Islam  la Carte
This is composed of Islamists who are militat-
ing in favour of the institution of an Islamic
republic but within the context of ÔrepublicanÕ
order. Through their participation in political
life, these parties are trying to reconcile reli-
gion and modernity, opposition and govern-
ment and not opposition to the government,
as can be seen with Hamas which, led by Mah-
foud Nahnah, has become the Movement of
society for civil peace Ð one of the important
parties on the political scene.
HAMAS (MSP)
If ambiguities, contradictions and demagogy
are the characteristics of government, then the
latter is not alone in making use of these
because opposition parties have recourse to
the same practices. With the RCD and Euahadi,
we are dealing with the ÔradicalÕ, anticlerical
opposition to the government while Mahfoud
NahnahÕs Hamas constitutes a moderate Ôreli-
giousÕ opposition to the government since it is
the only one (with DjaballahÕs Ennahdha) to
officially embody Islam. But the Islam to which
Hamas lays claim is very open and modernist in
appearance compared with that advocated by
the old FIS.
Since Algeria gained independence, Hamas,
now the MSP, has been represented on the
political scene by its charismatic leader Mah-
foud Nahnah. Arabist in the eastern manner,
linked to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the
Sheikh is nonetheless far removed from other
Islamists both in terms of image and strategy.
Physically, the Sheikh resembles any other
modern-day Arab or Muslim leader. Dressed in
an expensive Western suit and tie, his beard
neatly trimmed, he gives the impression of
membership of a modernist elite which is nev-
ertheless linked to Islam. In fact, Hamas em-
braces a middle class from the business world
(tradesmen) but also Arabist technocrats and a
scientific elite. HamasÕ social base distinguish-
es itself diametrically from that of the FIS
sphere of influence. Contrary to the FIS, which
extols social justice, Hamas bases its strategy
on order and thus respect for the ÔprinceÕ.
It is doubtless for this reason that Sheikh
Nahnah will very soon distance himself from
the radical Islamists. Is this really based on
principles of tolerance and open-mindedness
or political calculation? We shall never know.
Since 1988, he violently opposed Ali Benhaj
whom he calls a fanatic. He was, at first, equal-
ly opposed to the formation of Islamic political
parties before creating one himself. According
to NahnahÕs project, it is the State as a whole
which must be re-Islamized. Sheikh NahnahÕs
project is not far removed from that of the fun-
damentalists of the 1940s in that it is based on
the moral and religious education of society,
preaching and charitable action. He shows
himself favourable to the emancipation of
women and their participation in modern soci-
ety, thus granting them the opportunity to
improve and raise themselves but while
remaining within the context of Islamic law.
According to the Sheikh, women are equal to
men in the context of the family code (inspired
directly by the Sharia) that is currently in force
and which does not recognize this equality
that Sheikh Nahnah nevertheless makes his
hobby horse.
Contrary to that of his rivals, Mahfoud Nah-
nahÕs strategy thus consists of compromising
with the system while making token conces-
sions. As in the struggle which opposed the
radical nationalists (Messali Hadj) and the oth-
ers (the moderates, UDMA and Oulmas unit-
ed), the struggle here consists of claiming the
paternity of Islam, thus legitimacy. Hamas is
showing itself open (is it?) by making conces-
sions with the aim of gaining the sympathy of
the population which was hostile to the old FIS,
in the hope of winning over the Ômiddle-classÕ
strata which had little sympathy for the Ôsecu-
larÕ democratic parties. He is encouraging com-
merce, private enterprise, the participation of
women in development, etc. With the FIS
banned, the Sheikh has all the room he needs
to channel an entire ÔIslamistÕ population that is
now in disarray. His situation as a representa-
tive of Islam in a position of strength (with Dja-
ballahÕs Ennahdha) Ð in other words, aligning
itself with the government Ð does not entirely
earn him credit. On the contrary, because, in
the eyes of the radical Islamists, Hamas discred-
its itself by siding with the government. He
allows the system to use religion in the same
way as it uses secularity. None of these contra-
dictions embarrass Hamas which exists legally
not because it represents Islam but because
basically it poses no danger to the existing sys-
tem. The last elections are there to prove that
Nahnah is the man of the moment. He has suc-
ceeded in granting himself real legitimacy by
capturing part of the old FISÕs power base. Nah-
nah knows how to bend his shoulders to
achieve his final objective: to wait and compro-
mise in order to share power legally.
Perhaps recent events (following the mas-
sacres of the summer of 1997) will lead to a re-
composition of the political scene, particularly
in view of the civil truce initiated by the FIS and
its armed wing, the AIS (Arme Islamique du
Salut, or Islamic Salvation Army). If the radical
Islamists return to the political scene (even
under a different banner), they will unquestion-
ably contribute to a change in circumstances
and, in a way, to an intrusion on their rivalsÕ pre-
serves. With the civil truce, the government will
have succeeded in fragmenting the Islamist
movements in the hope of isolating the GIA
who are continuing to practise their own
bloody form of guerrilla warfare. In that it is
eminently political, the game played by moder-
ate Islamists appears from this fact to be more
profitable than that of the radicals. '
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Islamic cultures have inherited and
d eveloped a legacy of urbanism that
s t retches back to the ancient
civilizations of the Middle East.
I n contrast to well-organized states
such as that of historic China Islamic
societies formed themselves into
l o o s e ly-organized states based on
intricate social netwo r k s .N e t wo r k
t h e o ry and network models seem to
fit the actuality of Islamic society and
help us to comprehend a society that
has a coherent overall order without
h aving a formal structure. But until
n ow, most studies of Islamic society
h ave focused exclusive ly on urban
social organization, often neglecting
the extension of power to rural are a s .
In this important wo r k , the authors
examine the social religious and
a d m i n i s t r a t i ve networks that gove r n e d
rural and urban areas and led to state
fo r m a t i o n ,p roviding a more inclusive
v i ew of the mechanisms of power and
c o n t rol in the Islamic world than has
ever been available befo re.
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